Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1983

Kae Smith v. Dan M. Vuicich : Brief of Appellant

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Robert B. Hansen; Attorneys for Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Smith v. Vuicich, No. 19392 (1983).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/5163

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

llobert B. Hansen

965 East 4800 South, Suite 2
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (801) 262-8915

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
KAE SMITH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

vs.

BRIEF OF APPELLNIT
Case No. 19392

DAN M. VU! CI CH,

Defendant/Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT CDUIT ,
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP, JUDGE.
•.

Robert •• ...-./'
Attome.y for flit
9'i5 East 4BIQ
Salt Lake Cft.J. '.

LYNN S. DAVIES

Attorney for jle
P. 0. Box 2415
Salt Lake City,

Robert B. Hansen
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
KAE SMITH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Case No. 19392

DAN M. VUICICH,
Defendant/ Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP, JUDGE

Robert B. Hansen
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
LYNN S. DAV I ES
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
P. 0. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

....

I

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
NATURE OF CASE . .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW
ARGUMENT . . .

2

POINT I:

RESPONDENT'S COUNTERCLAIM DOES NOT STATE
A CLAIM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

POINT II:

THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF ANY IMPROPER
PURPOSE ON THE PART OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT TO
SUSTAIN A JUDGMENT FOR ABUSE OF PROCESS

CONCLUSION . . .

2

. 4

6

STATUTE CITED
Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 78-27-56(1953) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
RULES CITED
Rule 9(b), U.R.C.P.

3

Rule 12(h), U.R.C.P.

2

CASES CITED
Crease v. Pleasant Grove City, 519 P.2d 888, 30 Utah 2d 451. . .

4

TEXTS CITED
1 Am. Jr. 2d 252 (Abuse of Process, Sec. 4). . . . . . . . . . .

3

Robert B. Hansen
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
KAE SMITH,

Plaintiff/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.
DAN M. VUC I CH ,

Case No. 19392

Defendant/Respondent.
NATURE OF CASE
This was an action for trespass upon unimproved property and a Counterclaim for abuse of process and for statutory attorneys' fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Plaintiff/Appellant alleged that the defendant trespassed upon certain
unimproved property and used certain vehicles and equipment thereon (in
order to construct a swimming pool on his own property) without her consent
and this caused damage to her soil, its natural contouring and vegetation
upon said property ( R 3 ,4).

The defendant contended that he had oral

permission of Plaintiff/Appellant to do so and denied that the use he made of
said property caused it any damages (R 7 ,8).

Contending that Plaintiff/

Appellant's suit had no merit whatsoever and his use of it and after use
treatment improved the property the Defendant/Respondent filed a Counterclaim
with his Answer (R 9,10).

DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW
After a jury trial which resulted in a verdict in favor of Defendant/
Respondent and against Plaintiff/Appellant on all issues, the Court disrnisse,:
the Complaint and entered judgment for $3,300 on the Counterclaim (R 106,ln?)
Plaintiff/Appellant filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
(R 109) and a Motion for a New Trial (R llO).

They were denied (R 116,1171.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff/Appellant seeks to have this Court reverse the lower court
and remand the case with instructions to dismiss the Counterclaim with
prejudice and to enter a judgment of "no cause of action" thereon.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENT'S COUNTERCLAIM DOES NOT STATE A CLAIM.
Defendant/Respondent's Counterclaim failed to state a cause of action
for abuse of process and it was therefore error to enter a judgment
thereon.

To the extent said Counterclaim alleged an action for civil

malicious prosecution, the Counterclaim was dismissed without prejudice
upon a Motion to Dismiss (R 37,38).

Defendant/Respondent's pleading on

which the judgment for abuse of process is grounded (R 73) alleges that
Plaintiff "has commenced this meritless action against defendant malicioush
and with intent to defraud defendant" ( R l 0).
The first consideration is whether this defense may be raised at this
late date.

Rule 12(h) of U.R.C.P. provides that certain defenses are not

waived even though not presented by motion, answer or reply and the first
2

of such defenses enumerated as such exceptions to the general rule is
"the defense of failure to state a cl aim upon which relief can be granted."
Respondent's pleading rather clearly (and correctly) implies that
the filing of a lawsuit which lacks merit does not, standing alone,justify
recovery as it asserts that such was done "maliciously and with intent
to defraud."

Rule 9(b) U.R.C.P., however, states that "In all averments

of fraud or mistakes, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake
shall be stated with particularity."

Since there were no particulars

stated in the subject pleading, the sole issue on this point is whether
or not an allegation that the party complained about filed a lawsuit
"maliciously" states all the elements required for a claim based on abuse
of process.
rmre.

Appellant contends that the authorities on this point require

Although the term "abuse of process" is a "label for a variety of

dissimilar situations which have in common only the fact that actionable
injury was inflicted in connection with the use of judicial process"
(1 Am Jur 2d, 252, Abuse of Process, Sec. 4) under the circumstances of
this case (Sec. 13 of authority last cited, to-wit "Institution and
prosecution of civil action")cne must allege not only maliciousness but
also "without probable cause" (Sec. 13, supra).

The Court correctly

instructed the jury that they might find Appellant guilty of abuse of
process if they found that she brought this lawsuit "solely for the purpose
of vexing and harassing Respondent or pursued this lawsuit in an effort to
force him into settlement to which she knew that she was not entitled to"
(R 89).

A comparison of such specification of "without probable cause"

3

shows the disparity between "stating a cl aim upon which relief can be
granted" and the pleading here challenged.
is to render pleadings meaningless.

To uphold such pleadings

In 1976 this Court in the case of

Crease v. Pleasant Grove Citj 519 P.Zd 888, 30 Utah Zd 451 held that
the "essence of that cause of action is a perversion of the process to
accomplish some improper purpose . . " (P. 890).

Although that case reversed

a jury verdict on the lack of evidence to such those essential elements,
it does establish what those elements are and their pleading was essential
to state a cause of action under the circumstances applicable in this case.
POINT II
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF ANY IMPROPER PURPOSE ON THE
PART OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT TO SUSTAIN A JUDGMENT FOR ABUSE OF
PROCESS.
The only evidence in the record as to the Plaintiff/Appellant's
purpose in initiating this action other than her own testimony which
asserted a proper purpose was the testimony of Respondent "Just for the
money.

I can't see any other reason" in response to his counsel's

question "Have you fonnulated a conclusion as to her apparent intentions
in bringing this lawsuit?" (T135).

That testimony does not sustain a

finding of an improper purpose in bringing a lawsuit.

If it did, the vast

majority of unsuccessful plaintiffs would be in jeopardy for suing for the
money, which is a proper purpose of a 1 awsui t.

At the argument on the

motion for a new trial Respondent's counsel asserted that were a dozen or
so places in the record where the evidence sustained a wrongful purpose
but all of them would be encompassed within a claim that plaintiff had

had not testified truthfully.

Appellant respectfully submits that a

jury verdict on the issues in question does not prove Appellant lied
at all (she offered no evidence at all as to damages to her property.
Her brother alone testitied as to that).

A much more likely conclusion

is that the jury did not believe the property had been damaged (only
$300 actual damages were asserted- the main reason. for the suit according
to Appellant's testimony
be

was to protect her against lawsuit that might

brought by her neighbors if the road built by Respondent over her

property caused such erosion as would dump debris on their property the property being very steep and sloping in two directions) and punitive
damages against Respondent would not be proper even if she had not consented
but Respondent reasonably believed she had (he only asserted on oral consent
v.ilereas he knew she wanted a written contract).
Where, as in this case, the damages sought for abuse of process are
the amount of the attorney's fees this Court might well conclude that the
issue of attorney's fees should be decided by the trial court pursuant to
Sec. 78-27-56, U.C.A., 1953 (Supp. 1981) rather than by the jury since the
Legislature has seen fit to make that a discretionary statutory remedy
when either party to a lawsuit Proceeds without merit and not in good
faith.

The trial court in this case did not see fit to use that law as

the basis of or to bolster the jury verdict on which the judgement is
based on that ground.

Judges obviously are better qualified by both

training and experience to determine the existence of the two elements
necessary to create liability and to assess the amount of such an award
where proper.
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In the trial court Respondent convinced the jury that Appellant's
claim was without merit.

For at least equally good reason Appellant

urges this Court to find that Respondent's Counterclaim is without merit.
To equate a purpose of obtaining money through a judgment in a trespass
case where the defendant admittedly went upon plaintiff's land with
heavy construction equipment which necessarily caused damage to plaintiff's
land, however temporarily, with such an improper purpose as to sustain a
counterclaim judgment for abuse of process is to arm the defense with an
awesome weapon which may thoroughly chill an injured party's application
for redress through the courts.

At the very least this Court ought to

require the tria'.i court to refrain from allowing the jury to award
damages on such a counterclaim where the facts do not impel him to award
statutory attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION
This case should be remanded to the District Court to enter judgment
in favor of Plaintiff/Appellant on the Counterclaim as to the abuse of
process claim upon which the present judgment is based.
Respectfully submitted this

10""-day of October, 1983.

-

Robert B. Hansen
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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The undersigned hereby acknowledges receipt of two copies of the
foregoing brief this _ _ _ day of October, 1983.
Lynn S. Davies
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
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